PROBLEM OF THE WEEK Solution of Problem No. 3 (Fall 2002 Series)

Problem: Two players A, B, engage in a game. A move consists in each showing simultaneously an open (O) or closed (C) hand. If two O's show, A wins \$3; if two C's show, A wins \$1; if an O and a C show, B wins \$2.

- a) Is there a winning strategy for A? for B?
- b) If there is one, is it unique?

Solution (by Rob Pratt, Grad. at U. of North Carolina)

Assume that the loser pays the winner the prize money. Let p be the probability that A shows O, and let q be the probability that B shows O. Then A wants to choose p so that, no matter which action B takes, the expected payoff to A (under A's randomized strategy) will be positive. That is,

$$\min\{3p - 2(1-p), -2p + 1(1-p)\} > 0.$$

But this condition implies that p > 2/5 and p < 1/3, an impossibility. So A has no winning strategy. Similarly, B wants to choose q so that

$$\min\{-3q + 2(1-q), 2q - 1(1-q)\} > 0,$$

which implies that 1/3 < q < 2/5. Any such q defines a winning strategy for B, so the winning strategy is not unique. But we now show that q = 3/8 is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the worst-case expected payoff to B. Since the minimum of two linear functions with slopes of opposite sign has a unique maximum at the intersection point of the two lines, we have

$$\max_{0 \le q \le 1} \min\{-3q + 2(1-q), 2q - 1(1-q)\}$$

=
$$\max_{0 \le q \le 1} \min\{-5q + 2, 3q - 1\}$$

=
$$\min\{-5(3/8) + 2, 3(3/8) - 1\}$$

=
$$\min\{1/8, 1/8\}$$

=
$$1/8.$$

Hence, q = 3/8 achieves the maximum worst-case expected payoff to B of 12.5 cents.

Also solved by:

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Two incorrect solutions were received.