CS 593/MA 592 - Intro to Quantum Computing Spring 2024 Thursday, March 28 - Lecture 11.2

Today's scribe: Ethan Dickey [Note: not proofread by Eric]

Reading: None.

Agenda:

- 1. Hidden Subgroup problem
- 2. Graph isomorphism (and reduction to HSP)
- 3. HSP for $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$

1 Hidden Subgroup Problem

Remark. Since I (Eric) am looking for new applications of quantum computing, I take the perspective that QFT is, in some sense, Pontragian Duality.

1.1 Definitions

Definition 1 (Hidden Subgroup). *Given a (finite*¹) group G that we know "explicitly," a set X that we know "explicitly," and oracle access to a function $f : G \to X$ which is promised to satisfy the following:

 \exists subgroup $H \subseteq G$ such that $f(g_1) = f(g_2) \iff g_1 H = g_2 H$

We say that f "hides H."

The intuition behind ?? is that f is an H-periodic function on G valued at X.

Definition 2 (Hidden Subgroup Problem). *Given a hidden subgroup as in* ??, *determine H explicitly (i.e. find elements* $g_1, \ldots, g_l \in G$ such that $\langle g_1, \ldots, g_l \rangle = H$).

Assuming $|G| < \inf$, we can express the elements of G using bitstrings of length L = O(log|G|). Equipped with these bitstrings, "to know G explicitly" means we have access to functions U_m and i_n that encode the group multiplication and inversion:

$$U_m : GxG \to G$$

$$(g_1, g_2) \mapsto g_1g_2$$

$$i_n : G \to G$$

$$g \mapsto g^{-1}$$

Ideally, we can find generators of *H* in time $O(\text{polylog}|G|)^2$. Time O(poly|G|) is not interesting because one can simply iterate through all of the group elements and test for collisions (because $H = g_1^{-1}g_2H$ implies $g_1^{-1}g_2$ is a group member).

In particular, this means we can only call the oracle for G O(polylog|G|) times.

To formulate quantum oracle access, we will assume G, f, X are encoded as follows:

¹For this course, we will assume G (a group) is finite.

²Polylog definition

1. Elements of *G* are encoded as bitstrings:

$$G \subseteq \{0,1\}^L \implies \mathbb{C}G \le (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L}$$

Where \leq is used as subspace notation. We also assume we have a unity:

$$E: (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \to (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L}$$
$$E|0...0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|G|}} \sum_{g \in G} |g\rangle$$

This *E* generalizes $H^{\otimes L}$ when $N = 2^L$.

- 2. Similarly, we will assume $X \subseteq \{0,1\}^M$, M = O(poly(L)).
- 3. Quantum oracle access to f will mean we have a unitary $U_f : (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \otimes (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes M} \to (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \otimes (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes M}$ such that $U_f | g, 0_1 \dots 0_m \rangle = | g, f(g) \rangle$ (note that we do not care what U_f does to other computational basis vectors).

Note that while we don't need it, having "explicit" quantum oracle access to *G* means we also have $U_m : (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \otimes (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \otimes (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \to (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \otimes (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L} \otimes (\mathbb{C}^2)^{\otimes L}$ with $U_m |g_1, g_2, 0 \dots 0\rangle = |g_1, g_2, g_1 g_2\rangle$

1.2 What is known about HSP?

HSP provides a framework that captures nearly all examples of exponential quantum advantage decision problems. In short, there are basically no efficient classical algorithms for HSP on *any* infinite families of groups that we know of.

Oracle problems:

- Factoring, order finding, Deutsch-Jozsa, Simon, Bernstein-Vazirani, period finding, etc. all reduce to HSP for *abelian* groups.
- Ettenger-Høyer-Knill (2004)³: for *any* HSP (on a finite group), we can solve it using O(polylog|G|) quantum oracle queries. (Classically, in general, proved that we need at least $\theta(|G|)$ queries, even for abelian groups.) However, we need to perform an exponential amount of quantum postprocessing (unfortunately).
- If $H \triangleleft G$ (and $|G| < \inf$), then Hallgren-Russell-(Ta-Shma) (2000)⁴ showed that HSP can be solved efficiently quantumly. This is strongly related to the "Fourier Sampling" problem.
- There are many examples of groups that are "close" to abelian groups that admit efficient quantum solutions.

Some important problems (other than factoring) reduce to non-abelian HSP:

- Certain flavors of the "shortest vector problem" (SVP) reduce to HSP for $G = D_N$ a dihedral group (symmetries of a regular N-gon). (There are lattice-based cryptography algorithms that depend on SVP.)
 - There is no known efficient algorithm for dihedral HSP, but there is a subexponential time quantum algorithm due to Kuperberg (2005)⁵ and Regev (2004)⁶
- Graph isomorphism reduces to HSP for $G = S_n$, the symmetric group.

³The quantum query complexity of the hidden subgroup problem is polynomial

⁴Normal subgroup reconstruction and quantum computation using group representations

⁵A subexponential-time quantum algorithm for the dihedral hidden subgroup problem

⁶A Subexponential Time Algorithm for the Dihedral Hidden Subgroup Problem with Polynomial Space

2 Graph isomorphism

(Aside: In the past 10 years, it has been shown to be in quasi-polynomial time of $O(n^{logn})$ ish⁷.)

Definition 3 (Graph Isomorphism Problem). *Input:* $\Gamma_1 = (V_1, E_1)$, $\Gamma_2 = (V_2, E_2)$, *both are assumed to be connected. Output: YES if* $\Gamma_1 \simeq \Gamma_2$, *NO otherwise.*

We will convert each instance of this problem to an instance of HSP with $G = S_n$ with $n = |V_1| + |V_2|$.

• To do this, we will build X and $f: G \to X$ that hides a subgroup that "knows" whether or not $\Gamma_1 \simeq \Gamma_2$.

Proof. Assume $V_1 = \{1, ..., n\}$ and $V_2 = \{n+1, ..., 2n\}$. Consider $G = S_{2n}$. We can identify (abstractly) the automorphism: $Aut(\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2) \subseteq S_{2n}$. We will build an *f* that hides this.

This construction is sufficient for 2 reasons:

1. There is an automorphism of their union that swaps the 2:

$$\Gamma_1 \simeq \Gamma_2 \iff \exists \alpha \in Aut(\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2) \text{ s.t. } \alpha(\Gamma_1) = \Gamma_2$$

2. \exists such an $\alpha \iff \forall$ generating sets g_1, \ldots, g_l of $Aut(\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2)$, some g_i swaps Γ_1 and Γ_2 .

Let *X* = all graphs Γ with $V(\Gamma) = \{1, 2, ..., 2n\}$ and $\Gamma \simeq \Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2$.

Define $F: S_{2n} \to X, \ \sigma \mapsto \sigma * (\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2)$

Here we note that the size of X doesn't really matter because we can write down an element of X efficiently.

Proposition 1. F hides $Aut(\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2)$. That is, $F(\alpha) = F(\tau) \iff Aut(\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2) = \tau Aut(\Gamma_1 \cup \Gamma_2)$

We do not prove ?? in this proof.

3 HSP for $\mathbf{A} = \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$

We start with the following definitions: *N* an integer in binary, elements of $A = \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ are represented by 0, 1, ..., N-1 (in binary).

We are given an oracle $f: \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \to X$ that satisfies: $f(a) = f(b) \iff a + H = b + H$ where $H \subseteq \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$.

Since *A* is cyclic, so are all of its subgroups (including *H*). Thus, $\exists h \in A$ s.t. $H = \langle h \rangle$, and we want to find this *h*. We take a step back to define some notation. Let $\omega = \exp 2\pi i/N$, then we can consider FT_A as FT_A: $A \to \hat{A} = Hom(A, V(1))$ (dual of A) for $a \mapsto \rho_a$ where $\rho_a = A \to V(1)$ for $b \mapsto \omega^{ab}$.

Next, we define $H^{\perp} = \{ \rho \in A \mid \rho(h) = 1 \forall h \in H \}$. In words, H^{\perp} is the set (group) of irreducible representations of *A* that are trivial when restricted to *H*. What follows is a generalization of 1b on Homework 7.

Lemma 2. H^{\perp} determines *H*. In particular, if we know generators of H^{\perp} , then we can find *h* in classical polynomial time.

Lemma 3. The output of the following circuit is a uniformly random chosen element of A such that $FT_A(y) \in H^{\perp}$



By the same reasoning as for Simon's problem, only a few applications of this circuit are necessary to find a generating set of H^{\perp} .

⁷Graph Isomorphism in Quasipolynomial Time